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Abstract	  
	  
On	  an	  average	  week,	  23%	  of	  the	  US	  population	  takes	  acetaminophen	  (i.e.	  paracetamol;	  
active	  ingredient	  in	  Tylenol;	  Kaufman,	  Kelly,	  Rosenberg,	  Anderson,	  &	  Mitchell,	  2002).	  Originally	  
viewed	  as	  just	  a	  physical	  pain	  killer,	  acetaminophen	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  other	  
psychological	  processes	  (DeWall	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  DeWall,	  Chester,	  &	  White,	  2015;	  Durso,	  Luttrell,	  &	  
Way,	  2015;	  Randles,	  Heine,	  &	  Santos,	  2013).	  With	  such	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  
routinely	  taking	  acetaminophen,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  know	  how	  it	  might	  affect	  social	  and	  economic	  
outcomes.	  Here	  we	  used	  a	  battery	  of	  economic	  games	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  acetaminophen	  has	  
consistent	  effects	  on	  decision-­‐making,	  but	  the	  direction	  of	  acetaminophen’s	  effect	  depends	  on	  
whether	  the	  individual	  has	  high	  or	  low	  expectations.	  In	  a	  monetary	  investment	  game	  (i.e.	  trust	  
game),	  acetaminophen	  increased	  investments	  from	  subjects	  with	  low	  expected	  returns	  from	  
the	  trustee,	  but	  decreased	  investments	  from	  subjects	  with	  high	  expected	  returns.	  Next,	  in	  a	  
negotiation	  game	  (i.e.	  ultimatum	  game),	  we	  used	  sequences	  of	  high	  and	  low	  monetary	  offers	  to	  
exogenously	  manipulate	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  responders.	  Acetaminophen	  increased	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  relatively	  unfair	  offers	  and	  reduced	  the	  acceptance	  of	  relatively	  fair	  offers.	  
Finally,	  acetaminophen	  also	  caused	  trustees	  in	  the	  trust	  game	  to	  be	  less	  influenced	  by	  their	  
beliefs	  about	  how	  much	  the	  investors	  expected	  them	  to	  return.	  Thus,	  acetaminophen	  also	  
reduced	  how	  beliefs	  about	  another’s	  expectations	  drove	  reciprocity.	  Overall,	  our	  results	  
demonstrate	  that	  acetaminophen	  has	  socially	  important	  but	  previously	  unrecognized	  
dampening	  effects	  on	  how	  people	  respond	  to	  both	  financial	  incentives	  and	  disincentives	  for	  
themselves	  and	  for	  others.	  Furthermore,	  our	  findings	  highlight	  what	  we	  believe	  to	  be	  a	  general	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principle	  of	  drug	  action:	  that	  psychological	  factors	  can	  change	  the	  behavioral	  and	  perhaps	  
clinical	  effects	  of	  drugs.	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Social	  Expectations	  Reverse	  the	  Effects	  of	  Acetaminophen	  on	  Economic	  Decision-­‐Making	  
	   On	  an	  average	  week,	  23%	  of	  the	  US	  population	  takes	  acetaminophen	  (ie.	  paracetamol;	  
the	  active	  ingredient	  in	  Tylenol;	  Kaufman	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  While	  people	  expect	  this	  over-­‐the-­‐
counter	  painkiller	  to	  alleviate	  their	  physical	  discomforts,	  most	  never	  stop	  to	  consider	  whether	  
the	  drug	  might	  have	  effects	  beyond	  the	  reduction	  of	  physical	  pain,	  much	  less	  that	  it	  could	  
influence	  their	  social	  interactions	  and	  decisions.	  This	  sort	  of	  targeted	  effect	  has	  long	  been	  the	  
general	  perception	  of	  acetaminophen	  and	  other	  medications	  among	  the	  lay	  public,	  scientists,	  
and	  the	  companies	  who	  manufacture	  and	  sell	  them.	  However,	  recent	  research	  has	  begun	  to	  
challenge	  this	  basic	  assumption.	  
	   Until	  recently,	  acetaminophen	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  just	  a	  physical	  painkiller	  without	  any	  
further	  psychological	  or	  behavioral	  effects.	  However,	  an	  accumulating	  body	  of	  work	  has	  now	  
shown	  acetaminophen	  to	  affect	  general	  evaluative	  processes.	  For	  example,	  acetaminophen	  has	  
been	  shown	  to	  reduce	  self-­‐reports	  of	  hurt	  feelings	  and	  neural	  responses	  associated	  with	  
experiences	  of	  social	  pain	  (DeWall	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Other	  studies	  have	  also	  shown	  acetaminophen	  
to	  dampen	  responses	  to	  other	  aversive	  experiences	  (DeWall	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Randles	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
Most	  recently,	  acetaminophen	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  reduce	  evaluations	  of	  both	  negative	  and	  
positive	  emotional	  images	  (Durso	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  Thus,	  there	  is	  emerging	  and	  consistent	  evidence	  
that	  acetaminophen	  dampens	  both	  negative	  and	  positive	  evaluations	  in	  general.	  However,	  no	  
research	  to	  date	  has	  examined	  whether	  acetaminophen	  impacts	  the	  economic	  decisions	  that	  
people	  make	  in	  social	  interactions.	  
	   Models	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  choice	  highlight	  evaluation	  as	  a	  central	  process	  in	  
decision-­‐making	  (e.g.,	  Rangel,	  Camerer,	  &	  Montague,	  2008).	  Thus,	  if	  acetaminophen	  dampens	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evaluations,	  it	  should	  influence	  the	  decisions	  that	  people	  make.	  However,	  when	  making	  
decisions	  as	  part	  of	  a	  social	  interaction,	  people’s	  evaluations	  and	  behaviors	  are	  critically	  shaped	  
by	  their	  expectations	  of	  the	  other	  person’s	  behaviors	  and	  beliefs	  (Chang	  &	  Sanfey,	  2013;	  Chang,	  
Smith,	  Dufwenberg,	  &	  Sanfey,	  2011;	  Darley	  &	  Fazio,	  1980;	  Delgado,	  Frank,	  &	  Phelps,	  2005;	  
Xiang,	  Lohrenz,	  &	  Montague,	  2013).	  That	  is,	  a	  person’s	  expectations	  about	  another’s	  behaviors	  
and	  beliefs	  can	  produce	  either	  positive	  or	  negative	  evaluations	  (e.g.,	  will	  this	  interaction	  end	  
positively	  or	  negatively?).	  Thus,	  because	  acetaminophen	  dampens	  both	  negative	  and	  positive	  
evaluations	  (Durso	  et	  al.,	  2015),	  the	  direction	  of	  its	  effects	  on	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  in	  a	  
social	  interaction	  should	  critically	  depend	  on	  the	  individual’s	  expectations.	  Here,	  we	  used	  a	  
battery	  of	  economic	  games	  across	  two	  double-­‐blind,	  placebo-­‐controlled	  studies	  to	  test	  the	  
hypotheses	  that	  (1)	  acetaminophen	  will	  impact	  social	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  and	  (2)	  that	  
the	  direction	  of	  acetaminophen’s	  effect	  will	  critically	  depend	  on	  social	  expectations.	  In	  both	  
studies,	  subjects	  received	  either	  1000mg	  of	  acetaminophen	  or	  placebo,	  both	  in	  a	  liquid	  vehicle,	  
and	  completed	  the	  critical	  tasks	  1	  hour	  after	  drug	  administration.	  Subjects	  were	  compensated	  
based	  on	  one	  of	  their	  decisions,	  which	  was	  selected	  at	  random.	  
	   In	  study	  1,	  we	  tested	  whether	  acetaminophen	  would	  interact	  with	  a	  person’s	  
expectations	  when	  deciding	  how	  much	  money	  to	  entrust	  to	  another	  person.	  One	  hundred	  
twenty-­‐two	  undergraduates	  at	  The	  Ohio	  State	  University	  played	  the	  role	  of	  investor	  in	  4	  one-­‐
shot	  trust	  games	  with	  anonymous	  partners.	  In	  each	  trust	  game,	  subjects	  were	  given	  a	  monetary	  
endowment	  and	  allowed	  to	  send	  as	  much	  or	  as	  little	  as	  they	  liked	  to	  their	  partner.	  They	  were	  
instructed	  that	  their	  investment	  would	  be	  multiplied	  by	  4	  and	  then	  given	  to	  their	  partner	  (the	  
trustee)	  who	  would	  then	  decide	  how	  much	  to	  return	  to	  the	  investor.	  After	  making	  each	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investment	  decision,	  subjects	  reported	  how	  much	  they	  expected	  the	  trustee	  to	  return.	  A	  linear	  
mixed-­‐effects	  regression	  revealed	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  drug	  condition	  and	  investor	  
expectations	  on	  the	  amount	  invested	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.162	  (0.067),	  t	  =	  -­‐2.417,	  p	  =	  0.016).	  Further	  analysis,	  
revealed	  that	  acetaminophen	  increased	  the	  amount	  invested	  when	  subjects	  had	  negative	  
expectations	  (b	  =	  0.184	  (0.095),	  t	  =	  1.947,	  p	  =	  0.053)	  but	  decreased	  the	  amount	  invested	  when	  
subjects	  had	  positive	  expectations	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.145	  (0.084),	  t	  =	  -­‐1.736,	  p	  	  =	  0.085;	  see	  Figure	  1).	  Thus,	  
acetaminophen	  affected	  trust	  behavior,	  but	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  effect	  was	  determined	  by	  the	  
valence	  of	  the	  investor’s	  expectations.	  
	   In	  study	  2,	  we	  sought	  to	  extend	  our	  findings	  from	  study	  1	  by	  exogenously	  inducing	  
positive	  or	  negative	  expectations	  in	  a	  negotiation	  game.	  One	  hundred	  nineteen	  undergraduates	  
at	  The	  Ohio	  State	  University	  played	  the	  responder	  in	  several	  one-­‐shot	  ultimatum	  games	  with	  
anonymous	  partners.	  In	  each	  ultimatum	  game,	  a	  subject	  from	  another	  study	  (the	  proposer)	  
proposed	  how	  to	  split	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  with	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  current	  study	  (the	  responder).	  If	  
the	  responder	  accepted	  the	  offer,	  both	  players	  would	  be	  paid	  accordingly.	  If	  the	  responder	  
rejected	  the	  offer,	  both	  players	  would	  receive	  nothing.	  The	  offers	  varied	  in	  fairness	  (i.e.,	  
proportion	  of	  total	  sum	  offered	  to	  the	  responder).	  Past	  work	  has	  shown	  that	  when	  completing	  
repeated	  ultimatum	  games	  in	  sequence,	  the	  fairness	  of	  prior	  offers	  shapes	  responders’	  
expectations	  and	  thus	  their	  rates	  of	  offer	  acceptance	  of	  subsequent	  offers	  (Xiang	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
For	  example,	  the	  same	  offer	  (e.g.,	  30%	  of	  the	  total	  sum)	  will	  be	  evaluated	  more	  positively	  or	  
more	  negatively	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  preceding	  offer	  either	  lowered	  expectations	  (e.g.,	  
10%	  of	  the	  total	  sum)	  or	  raised	  expectations	  (e.g.,	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  sum),	  respectively.	  
Therefore,	  we	  used	  trial-­‐to-­‐trial	  fluctuations	  in	  offer	  fairness	  to	  manipulate	  expectations.	  A	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linear	  mixed-­‐effects	  regression	  revealed	  an	  interaction	  between	  drug	  condition	  and	  changes	  in	  
offer	  fairness	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.364	  (0.197),	  z	  =	  -­‐1.844,	  p	  =	  0.065;	  see	  Figure	  2)	  such	  that	  subjects	  on	  
acetaminophen	  were	  less	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  offer	  fairness	  (b	  =	  0.48	  (0.156),	  z	  =	  3.105,	  p	  =	  
0.002)	  relative	  to	  placebo	  (b	  =	  0.849	  (0.173),	  z	  =	  4.9,	  p	  <	  0.0001).	  Thus,	  acetaminophen,	  relative	  
to	  placebo,	  increased	  acceptance	  of	  offers	  that	  showed	  a	  relative	  decrease	  in	  fairness	  and	  
decreased	  acceptance	  of	  offers	  that	  showed	  a	  relative	  increase	  in	  fairness.	  
	   Finally,	  we	  aimed	  to	  test	  if	  acetaminophen	  would	  interact	  the	  perceptions	  of	  another	  
person’s	  expectations	  to	  influence	  behavior.	  To	  address	  this	  question,	  subjects	  in	  study	  2	  also	  
played	  32	  one-­‐shot	  trust	  games	  in	  the	  role	  of	  trustee	  (responding	  to	  investments	  from	  subjects	  
in	  study	  1).	  Past	  work	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  trustees	  frequently	  demonstrate	  guilt-­‐aversion	  in	  
that	  they	  will	  avoid	  violating	  what	  they	  think	  the	  investor	  expects	  them	  to	  return	  (Chang	  et	  al.,	  
2011;	  Nihonsugi,	  Ihara,	  &	  Haruno,	  2015).	  Thus,	  we	  asked	  subjects	  how	  much	  they	  thought	  their	  
partner	  for	  each	  trust	  game	  expected	  them	  to	  return	  before	  deciding	  how	  much	  they	  would	  
actually	  return	  (Chang	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  A	  linear	  mixed-­‐effects	  regression	  revealed	  a	  significant	  
interaction	  between	  drug	  condition	  and	  expectations	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.092	  (0.032),	  t	  =	  -­‐2.897,	  p	  =	  .004;	  
see	  Figure	  3)	  such	  that	  subjects	  on	  acetaminophen	  were	  less	  sensitive	  to	  perceptions	  of	  
expectations	  (b	  =	  0.421	  (0.023),	  t	  =	  18.402,	  p	  <	  .0001)	  relative	  to	  placebo	  (b	  =	  0.513	  (0.022),	  t	  =	  
23.486,	  p	  <	  .0001).	  Furthermore,	  this	  effect	  was	  stronger	  among	  subjects	  high	  in	  shame	  
proneness	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.074	  (0.02),	  t	  =	  -­‐3.745,	  p	  <	  .0001),	  high	  in	  guilt	  proneness	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.034	  (0.02),	  t	  =	  
-­‐1.684,	  p	  =	  .092),	  high	  in	  measures	  of	  interpersonal	  sensitivity	  (i.e.,	  need	  to	  belong:	  b	  =	  -­‐0.16	  
(0.02),	  t	  =	  -­‐8.137,	  p	  <	  .0001;	  rejection	  sensitivity:	  b	  =	  -­‐0.094	  (0.017),	  t	  =	  -­‐5.433,	  p	  <	  .0001),	  and	  
high	  in	  affective	  components	  of	  empathy	  (i.e.,	  empathic	  concern:	  b	  =	  -­‐0.077	  (0.018),	  t	  =	  -­‐4.216,	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p	  <	  .0001;	  personal	  distress:	  b	  =	  -­‐0.09	  (0.02),	  t	  =	  -­‐4.532,	  p	  <	  .0001)	  but	  not	  a	  more	  cognitive	  
component	  of	  empathy	  (i.e.,	  perspective	  taking:	  b	  =	  -­‐0.002	  (0.019),	  t	  =	  -­‐0.095,	  p	  =	  .925).	  
Furthermore,	  following	  completion	  of	  the	  trust	  games,	  subjects	  were	  presented	  with	  recaps	  of	  
a	  subset	  of	  their	  decisions	  and	  asked	  how	  much	  guilt	  they	  would	  feel	  if	  they	  had	  returned	  a	  
randomly	  generated	  alternative	  amount	  (i.e.,	  counterfactual	  guilt;	  Chang	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Results	  
revealed	  an	  interaction	  between	  drug	  condition	  and	  how	  much	  less	  the	  generated	  alternative	  
was	  compared	  to	  the	  actual	  amount	  they	  returned	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.085	  (0.048),	  t	  =	  -­‐1.786,	  p	  =	  .075;	  see	  
Figure	  4	  and	  Table	  14)	  such	  that	  subjects	  on	  acetaminophen	  showed	  reduced	  guilt	  sensitivity	  (b	  
=	  0.446	  (0.046),	  t	  =	  9.597,	  p	  <	  .0001)	  relative	  to	  placebo	  (b	  =	  0.531	  (0.048),	  t	  =	  11.033,	  p	  <	  
.0001).	  Thus,	  acetaminophen,	  relative	  to	  placebo,	  reduced	  how	  sensitive	  trustees	  were	  to	  their	  
perceptions	  of	  investor	  expectations.	  Furthermore,	  this	  effect	  was	  strongest	  among	  subjects	  
who	  self-­‐reported	  high	  sensitivity	  to	  affective	  stimuli.	  
	   Across	  a	  battery	  of	  tasks,	  the	  results	  revealed	  novel	  and	  consistent	  effects	  of	  
acetaminophen	  of	  social	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  that	  critically	  depended	  on	  the	  subjects’	  
social	  expectations.	  In	  two	  of	  the	  tasks,	  the	  subject’s	  expectations	  reversed	  the	  effects	  that	  
acetaminophen	  had	  relative	  to	  placebo	  on	  trusting	  behavior	  and	  responses	  to	  fairness.	  The	  
third	  task	  revealed	  that	  acetaminophen	  reduced	  how	  much	  subjects	  used	  their	  own	  
perceptions	  of	  their	  partners’	  expectations	  when	  making	  decisions	  about	  reciprocating	  trust.	  
	   The	  current	  results	  reveal	  important	  insights	  for	  both	  basic	  and	  applied	  research.	  First,	  
given	  the	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  that	  takes	  acetaminophen	  each	  week,	  
acetaminophen	  may	  be	  having	  large-­‐scale,	  unexpected	  impacts	  on	  people’s	  social	  and	  
economic	  decision-­‐making.	  Understanding	  the	  nature	  and	  magnitude	  of	  these	  effects	  is	  an	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important	  topic	  for	  future	  research.	  Second,	  we	  believe	  that	  our	  data	  demonstrate	  what	  we	  
consider	  to	  be	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  drug	  action:	  that	  psychological	  factors	  can	  change	  the	  
behavioral	  and	  perhaps	  clinical	  effects	  of	  drugs.	  Further	  research	  adopting	  this	  perspective	  may	  
help	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  controversies	  and	  inconsistencies	  that	  are	  presently	  found	  in	  the	  
basic	  pharmacological	  and	  clinical	  literatures	  (e.g.,	  anti-­‐depressants	  sometimes	  increasing	  
suicide	  risk;	  see	  Hammad,	  Laughren,	  &	  Racoosin,	  2006;	  Miller,	  Swanson,	  Azrael,	  Pate,	  &	  
Stürmer,	  2014;	  Stone	  et	  al.,	  2009).	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SUPPLEMENTARY	  MATERIALS	  
Study	  1	  and	  2	  are	  described	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
Study	  1	  
One	  hundred	  twenty	  two	  undergraduates	  at	  The	  Ohio	  State	  University	  completed	  the	  
experiment	  in	  exchange	  for	  course	  credit.	  Subjects	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  take	  either	  an	  
acute	  dose	  of	  1,000	  mg	  of	  acetaminophen	  or	  a	  placebo,	  both	  in	  a	  liquid	  vehicle	  (61	  in	  each	  
condition).	  Experimenters	  and	  subjects	  were	  unaware	  of	  subjects’	  assignment	  to	  condition.	  
Subjects	  completed	  the	  study	  within	  individual	  cubicles.	  After	  a	  60-­‐min	  waiting	  period	  to	  allow	  
acetaminophen	  to	  enter	  the	  brain	  during	  which	  subjects	  completed	  self-­‐report	  questionnaires	  
and	  were	  allowed	  to	  rest,	  subjects	  completed	  the	  trust	  game.	  The	  trust	  game	  was	  administered	  
as	  a	  larger	  social	  and	  cognitive	  assessment	  (to	  be	  reported	  separately).	  Subjects	  were	  
financially	  compensated.	  Decisions	  from	  subjects	  in	  study	  1	  were	  presented	  to	  participants	  in	  
study	  2	  (see	  below),	  and	  one	  of	  these	  decisions	  was	  selected	  randomly	  to	  determine	  each	  
subject’s	  compensation.	  
In	  the	  trust	  game,	  subjects	  were	  given	  initial	  endowments	  of	  4	  different	  sizes	  and	  asked	  
to	  decide	  how	  much,	  if	  any,	  of	  this	  endowment	  they	  wished	  to	  send	  to	  an	  anonymous	  partner.	  
Thus,	  the	  subjects	  in	  study	  1	  acted	  as	  the	  investor	  in	  the	  trust	  game.	  The	  amount	  sent	  to	  the	  
partner	  was	  multiplied	  times	  4	  and	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  that	  the	  partner	  would	  decide	  how	  
much	  of	  this	  new	  amount	  to	  keep	  for	  him/herself	  and	  how	  much	  to	  return	  to	  the	  subject.	  After	  
making	  each	  investment	  decision,	  subjects	  were	  then	  asked	  how	  much	  they	  expected	  their	  
partner	  to	  return	  to	  them.	  On	  trials	  where	  subjects	  did	  not	  send	  anything	  to	  their	  partner,	  they	  
were	  not	  asked	  how	  much	  they	  expected	  to	  have	  returned.	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Results	  were	  examined	  using	  linear	  mixed	  effects	  models	  fit	  with	  the	  R	  package	  lme4.	  P-­‐
values	  were	  calculated	  with	  the	  lmerTest	  package.	  In	  all	  models,	  a	  random	  intercept	  for	  subject	  
was	  included.	  For	  each	  decision,	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  initial	  endowment	  that	  was	  invested	  was	  
calculated	  as	  well	  as	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  amount	  the	  partner	  received	  that	  the	  subject	  
expected	  to	  have	  returned.	  Drug	  condition	  was	  dummy	  coded.	  There	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  
drug	  on	  the	  proportion	  invested,	  b	  =	  -­‐0.06	  (0.155),	  t	  =	  -­‐0.386,	  p	  =	  0.7	  (see	  Table	  1).	  However,	  
there	  was	  a	  significant	  proportion	  expected	  returned	  by	  drug	  condition	  interaction,	  b	  =	  -­‐0.162	  
(0.067),	  t	  =	  -­‐2.417,	  p	  =	  0.016.	  Further	  examination	  showed	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  
expectations	  and	  proportion	  invested	  was	  stronger	  on	  placebo	  (b	  =	  0.302	  (0.048),	  t	  =	  6.258,	  p	  <	  
0.0001)	  than	  on	  acetaminophen	  (b	  =	  0.14	  (0.046),	  t	  =	  3.018,	  p	  =	  0.003).	  This	  model	  excluded	  
trials	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  did	  not	  make	  an	  investment	  because	  there	  was	  expected	  return	  
reported.	  However,	  the	  results	  remained	  the	  same	  when	  assuming	  that	  not	  investing	  anything	  
corresponded	  to	  an	  expectation	  of	  receiving	  nothing	  in	  return.	  Thus,	  subjects’	  expectations	  
were	  less	  predictive	  of	  the	  actual	  amount	  invested	  under	  acetaminophen.	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  direction	  of	  acetaminophen’s	  effects	  depended	  
on	  expectations,	  we	  divided	  the	  trials	  into	  three	  categories:	  trials	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  expected	  
to	  lose	  money	  (i.e.,	  a	  proportion	  expected	  return	  of	  less	  than	  .25;	  a	  negative	  outcome),	  trials	  in	  
which	  the	  subject	  expected	  to	  gain	  money	  (i.e.,	  a	  proportion	  expected	  return	  of	  greater	  than	  
.25;	  a	  positive	  outcome),	  and	  trials	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  expected	  the	  receive	  the	  same	  amount	  
as	  was	  invested	  (i.e.,	  a	  proportion	  expected	  return	  of	  .25;	  a	  neutral	  outcome).	  We	  felt	  justified	  
categorizing	  our	  continuous	  variable	  in	  this	  way	  for	  two	  reasons:	  (1)	  it	  makes	  explicit	  what	  we	  
consider	  to	  be	  positive	  and	  negative	  expectations	  and	  thus	  allows	  us	  to	  test	  whether	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acetaminophen	  actually	  produces	  opposing	  effects	  dependent	  on	  the	  valence	  of	  the	  
expectations;	  (2)	  a	  rational	  investor	  who	  expects	  to	  gain	  money	  should	  always	  invest	  more	  
because	  this	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  produce	  an	  increased	  profit	  and	  vice	  versa	  for	  an	  investor	  
who	  expects	  to	  lose	  money.	  Thus,	  while	  proportion	  expected	  return	  might	  be	  continuous,	  there	  
is	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  categorical	  structure	  to	  the	  variable’s	  relationship	  with	  actual	  amount	  
invested.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  acetaminophen	  increased	  the	  proportion	  
invested	  when	  subjects	  had	  negative	  expectations,	  b	  =	  0.184	  (0.095),	  t	  =	  1.947,	  p	  =	  0.053,	  but	  
decreased	  the	  proportion	  invested	  when	  subjects	  had	  positive	  expectations,	  b	  =	  -­‐0.145	  (0.084),	  
t	  =	  -­‐1.736,	  p	  	  =	  0.085	  (see	  Table	  2).	  There	  was	  no	  effect	  of	  drug	  condition	  when	  subjects	  had	  
neutral	  expectations,	  b	  =	  0.004	  (0.105),	  t	  =	  0.04,	  p	  =	  0.968.	  Thus,	  acetaminophen’s	  effect	  on	  
trusting	  investment	  behavior	  was	  reversed	  by	  the	  valence	  of	  the	  expectations	  that	  subjects	  
had.	  
Study	  2	  
One	  hundred	  nineteen	  undergraduates	  at	  The	  Ohio	  State	  University	  completed	  the	  
experiment	  in	  exchange	  for	  course	  credit.	  Subjects	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  take	  either	  an	  
acute	  dose	  of	  1,000	  mg	  of	  acetaminophen	  or	  a	  placebo,	  both	  in	  a	  liquid	  vehicle	  (61	  
acetaminophen).	  Experimenters	  and	  subjects	  were	  unaware	  of	  subjects’	  assignment	  to	  
condition.	  Subjects	  completed	  the	  study	  within	  individual	  cubicles.	  After	  a	  60-­‐min	  waiting	  
period	  to	  allow	  acetaminophen	  to	  enter	  the	  brain	  during	  which	  subjects	  completed	  self-­‐report	  
questionnaires	  and	  were	  allowed	  to	  rest,	  subjects	  completed	  the	  trust	  and	  ultimatum	  games.	  
These	  economic	  games	  were	  administered	  as	  a	  larger	  social	  and	  cognitive	  assessment	  (to	  be	  
reported	  separately).	  Subjects	  were	  financially	  compensated.	  Decisions	  from	  subjects	  in	  study	  2	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were	  paired	  with	  the	  corresponding	  subject	  in	  study	  1,	  and	  one	  of	  these	  decisions	  was	  selected	  
randomly	  to	  determine	  each	  subject’s	  compensation.	  
	   Subjects	  completed	  an	  ultimatum	  game	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  responder.	  Subjects	  were	  
presented	  with	  20	  proposals	  made	  by	  subjects	  in	  study	  1,	  which	  were	  preselected	  by	  the	  
experimenters	  to	  range	  from	  fair	  (e.g.,	  offering	  the	  responder	  .5	  of	  the	  money)	  to	  unfair	  (e.g.,	  
offering	  the	  responder	  .1	  of	  the	  money).	  The	  proposals	  were	  presented	  to	  every	  subject	  in	  the	  
same	  randomized	  sequence	  and	  it	  was	  explained	  to	  subjects	  that	  proposals	  came	  from	  
different	  partners	  (i.e.,	  one-­‐shot	  games).	  Subjects	  decided	  whether	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  each	  
proposal.	  Accepting	  a	  proposal	  meant	  that	  the	  money	  would	  be	  divided	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	  
proposer	  while	  rejecting	  meant	  that	  neither	  partner	  would	  receive	  anything.	  
	   Five	  subjects	  were	  dropped	  from	  the	  ultimatum	  game	  analyses	  for	  expressing	  confusion	  
about	  the	  task	  even	  after	  reviewing	  the	  instructions	  and	  passing	  a	  quiz	  over	  the	  instructions.	  A	  
mixed-­‐effects	  logistic	  regression	  was	  used	  to	  predict	  proposal	  acceptance	  from	  drug	  condition,	  
proportion	  of	  money	  offered	  to	  the	  responder	  (i.e.,	  offer	  fairness),	  the	  change	  in	  offer	  fairness	  
relative	  to	  the	  previous	  trial,	  and	  their	  interactions.	  Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  
with	  varying	  intercepts.	  The	  3-­‐way	  interaction	  and	  then	  the	  2-­‐way	  offer	  fairness	  by	  drug	  
condition	  interaction	  were	  each	  dropped	  from	  the	  model	  because	  they	  were	  not	  significant	  (b	  =	  
-­‐0.328	  (0.245),	  z	  =	  -­‐1.324,	  p	  =	  0.18;	  b	  =	  -­‐0.067	  (0.305),	  z	  =	  -­‐0.22,	  p	  =	  0.826;	  respectively).	  The	  
final	  model	  revealed	  an	  interaction	  between	  drug	  condition	  and	  the	  change	  in	  offer	  fairness	  (b	  
=	  -­‐0.364	  (0.197),	  z	  =	  -­‐1.844,	  p	  =	  0.065;	  see	  Table	  3)	  such	  that	  subjects	  on	  placebo	  were	  more	  
sensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  offer	  fairness	  (b	  =	  0.849	  (0.173),	  z	  =	  4.9,	  p	  <	  0.0001)	  than	  subjects	  on	  
acetaminophen	  (b	  =	  0.48	  (0.156),	  z	  =	  3.105,	  p	  =	  0.002).	  Thus,	  acetaminophen	  reduced	  how	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much	  shifts	  in	  expectations	  induced	  by	  trial-­‐to-­‐trial	  fluctuations	  in	  offer	  fairness	  influenced	  
offer	  acceptance.	  
	   Subjects	  also	  completed	  32	  one-­‐shot	  trials	  of	  a	  trust	  game	  in	  the	  role	  of	  trustee.	  
Investments	  came	  from	  subjects	  in	  study	  1.	  On	  each	  trial,	  subjects	  were	  first	  asked	  how	  much	  
of	  the	  initial	  endowment	  they	  expected	  their	  partner	  to	  invest.	  Next,	  subjects	  were	  informed	  of	  
how	  much	  their	  partner	  actually	  chose	  to	  invest	  and	  this	  investment	  was	  multiplied	  times	  4	  (see	  
study	  1).	  Then,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  how	  much	  they	  thought	  their	  partner	  expected	  them	  to	  
return.	  Finally,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  how	  much	  they	  would	  actually	  return	  and	  then	  were	  told	  
how	  much	  their	  partner	  had	  actually	  expected.	  
	   A	  linear	  mixed-­‐effects	  regression	  revealed	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  drug	  
condition	  and	  expectations	  (b	  =	  -­‐0.092	  (0.032),	  t	  =	  -­‐2.897,	  p	  =	  .004)	  such	  that	  subjects	  on	  
acetaminophen	  were	  less	  sensitive	  to	  perceptions	  of	  expectations	  (b	  =	  0.421	  (0.023),	  t	  =	  18.402,	  
p	  <	  .0001)	  relative	  to	  placebo	  (b	  =	  0.513	  (0.022),	  t	  =	  23.486,	  p	  <	  .0001).	  Furthermore,	  this	  effect	  
was	  stronger	  among	  subjects	  high	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  affective	  and	  interpersonal	  sensitivities	  (see	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Figure	  1.	  Trust	  Game	  as	  Investor	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Figure	  2.	  Ultimatum	  Game	  as	  Responder	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Figure	  3.	  Trust	  Game	  as	  Trustee	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Table	  1.	  Trust	  Game	  as	  Investor	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.6597,	  SD	  =	  0.8122).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  Estimate	   SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.096	   0.109	   0.886	   .378	  
Expected	  Return	   0.302	   0.048	   6.258	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	   -­‐0.06	   0.155	   -­‐0.386	   .7	  
Drug	  *	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.162	   0.067	   -­‐2.417	   .016	  
	  
	  
Table	  2.	  Trust	  Game	  as	  Investor	  (contrasts)	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.6912,	  SD	  =	  0.8314).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  Estimate	   SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   -­‐0.001	   0.081	   -­‐0.01	   .992	  
Neg_Acetaminophen	  vs.	  Neg_Placebo	   0.184	   0.095	   1.947	   .053	  
Neu_Acetaminophen	  vs.	  Neu_Placebo	   0.004	   0.105	   0.04	   .968	  
Pos_Acetaminophen	  vs.	  Pos_Placebo	   -­‐0.145	   0.084	   -­‐1.736	   .085	  
Neg_Expectations	  vs.	  Neu_Expectations	   -­‐0.225	   0.048	   -­‐4.707	   <	  .0001	  
Pos_Expectations	  vs.	  Neu_Expectations	   0.217	   0.045	   4.845	   <	  .0001	  
	  
	  
Table	  3.	  Ultimatum	  Game	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  6.931,	  SD	  =	  2.633).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  Estimate	   SE	   z	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.790	   0.382	   2.068	   .039	  
Proposal	  Fairness	   2.329	   0.167	   13.952	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	   -­‐0.088	   0.521	   -­‐0.169	   .866	  
Change	  in	  Fairness	   0.849	   0.173	   4.9	   <	  .0001	  
Proposal	  Fairness	  *	  Change	  in	  Fairness	   0.648	   0.122	   5.297	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	  *	  Change	  in	  Fairness	   -­‐0.364	   0.197	   -­‐1.844	   .065	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Table	  4.	  Trust	  Game	  as	  Trustee	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.1976,	  SD	  =	  0.4445).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  Estimate	   SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.028	   0.06	   28.118	   <	  .0001	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.24	   0.022	   11.135	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.513	   0.022	   23.486	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	   -­‐0.056	   0.083	   -­‐0.666	   .507	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.059	   0.031	   1.95	   .051	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.092	   0.032	   -­‐2.897	   .004	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.	  IRI	  Empathic	  Concern	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.2002,	  SD	  =	  0.4474).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.032	   0.061	   0.526	   .600	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.242	   0.022	   11.116	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.51	   0.022	   23.051	   <	  .0001	  
IRI	  Empathic	  Concern	   0.04	   0.057	   0.704	   .483	  
Drug	   -­‐0.067	   0.085	   -­‐0.792	   .43	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.063	   0.031	   2.051	   .04	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  IRI	  Empathic	  
Concern	  
0.062	   0.012	   5.134	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.1	   0.032	   -­‐3.101	   .002	  
Drug	  *	  IRI	  Empathic	  Concern	   -­‐0.016	   0.085	   -­‐0.184	   .854	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  IRI	  Empathic	  
Concern	  
-­‐0.077	   0.018	   -­‐4.216	   <	  .0001	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Table	  6.	  IRI	  Perspective	  Taking	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.1964,	  SD	  =	  0.4432).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.033	   0.060	   0.547	   .586	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.239	   0.022	   10.852	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.513	   0.023	   22.747	   <	  .0001	  
IRI	  Perspective	  Taking	   -­‐0.017	   0.061	   -­‐0.276	   .783	  
Drug	   -­‐0.059	   0.084	   -­‐0.694	   .489	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.068	   0.031	   2.174	   .03	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  IRI	  Perspective	  Taking	   0.008	   0.013	   0.58	   .562	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.103	   0.033	   -­‐3.173	   .002	  
Drug	  *	  IRI	  Perspective	  Taking	   0.123	   0.084	   1.463	   .146	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  IRI	  Perspective	  
Taking	  
-­‐0.002	   0.019	   -­‐0.095	   .925	  
	  
	  
Table	  7.	  IRI	  Personal	  Distress	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.2008,	  SD	  =	  0.4481).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.032	   0.061	   0.533	   .595	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.239	   0.022	   10.965	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.514	   0.022	   23.262	   <	  .0001	  
IRI	  Personal	  Distress	   0.043	   0.069	   0.62	   .536	  
Drug	   -­‐0.067	   0.085	   -­‐0.792	   .43	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.062	   0.031	   1.985	   .047	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  IRI	  Personal	  Distress	   0.055	   0.016	   3.478	   .001	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.096	   0.032	   -­‐2.985	   .003	  
Drug	  *	  IRI	  Personal	  Distress	   -­‐0.043	   0.088	   -­‐0.494	   .622	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  IRI	  Personal	  
Distress	  
-­‐0.09	   0.02	   -­‐4.532	   <	  .0001	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Table	  8.	  GASP	  Negative	  Behavior	  Evaluation	  (NBE)	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.1991,	  SD	  =	  0.4462).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.029	   0.06	   0.479	   .633	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.242	   0.022	   11.24	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.511	   0.022	   23.483	   <	  .0001	  
GASP	  NBE	   0.044	   0.052	   0.856	   .394	  
Drug	   -­‐0.057	   0.084	   -­‐0.681	   .497	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.06	   0.03	   1.958	   .05	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  GASP	  NBE	   0.054	   0.011	   4.85	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.093	   0.032	   -­‐2.937	   .003	  
Drug	  *	  GASP	  NBE	   -­‐0.031	   0.088	   -­‐0.348	   .728	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  GASP	  NBE	   -­‐0.034	   0.02	   -­‐1.684	   .092	  
	  
	  
Table	  9.	  GASP	  Repair	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.1974,	  SD	  =	  0.4443).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.033	   0.06	   0.554	   .581	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.241	   0.022	   11.203	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.518	   0.022	   23.764	   <	  .0001	  
GASP	  Repair	   0.055	   0.056	   0.982	   .328	  
Drug	   -­‐0.064	   0.083	   -­‐0.765	   .446	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.057	   0.03	   1.876	   .061	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  GASP	  Repair	   0.058	   0.012	   4.917	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.096	   0.032	   -­‐3.046	   .002	  
Drug	  *	  GASP	  Repair	   0.000	   0.084	   0.005	   .996	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  GASP	  Repair	   -­‐0.034	   0.018	   -­‐1.898	   .058	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Table	  10.	  GASP	  Negative	  Self	  Evaluation	  (NSE)	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.2,	  SD	  =	  0.4472).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.029	   0.06	   0.481	   .631	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.238	   0.021	   11.073	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.517	   0.022	   23.804	   <	  .0001	  
GASP	  NSE	   0.039	   0.053	   0.728	   .468	  
Drug	   -­‐0.057	   0.084	   -­‐0.675	   .501	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.062	   0.03	   2.034	   .042	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  GASP	  NSE	   0.07	   0.011	   6.547	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.096	   0.032	   -­‐3.02	   .003	  
Drug	  *	  GASP	  NSE	   0.011	   0.086	   0.125	   .901	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  GASP	  NSE	   -­‐0.074	   0.02	   -­‐3.745	   <	  .0001	  
	  
	  
Table	  11.	  GASP	  Withdraw	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.1999,	  SD	  =	  0.4471).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  Estimate	   SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.027	   0.06	   0.442	   .659	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.239	   0.022	   11.077	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.516	   0.022	   23.5	   <	  .0001	  
GASP	  Withdraw	   0.023	   0.06	   0.377	   .707	  
Drug	   -­‐0.052	   0.084	   -­‐0.62	   .537	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.057	   0.031	   1.877	   .061	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  GASP	  
Withdraw	  
-­‐0.017	   0.013	   -­‐1.37	   .171	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.092	   0.032	   -­‐2.882	   .004	  
Drug	  *	  GASP	  Withdraw	   -­‐0.007	   0.084	   -­‐0.083	   .934	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  
GASP	  Withdraw	  
-­‐0.004	   0.018	   -­‐0.215	   .829	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Table	  12.	  Need	  To	  Belong	  (NTB)	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.1928,	  SD	  =	  0.4391).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  Estimate	   SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.007	   0.06	   0.124	   .901	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.235	   0.021	   10.956	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.499	   0.022	   22.907	   <	  .0001	  
NTB	   0.104	   0.065	   1.598	   .113	  
Drug	   -­‐0.057	   0.084	   -­‐0.675	   .501	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.07	   0.031	   2.297	   .022	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  NTB	   0.098	   0.014	   6.814	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.097	   0.032	   -­‐3.042	   .002	  
Drug	  *	  NTB	   -­‐0.183	   0.085	   -­‐2.15	   .034	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  NTB	   -­‐0.16	   0.02	   -­‐8.137	   <	  .0001	  
	  
	  
Table	  13.	  Rejection	  Sensitivity	  Questionnaire	  (RSQ)	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.1723,	  SD	  =	  0.4151).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  Estimate	   SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.038	   0.058	   0.652	   .516	  
Offer	  Amount	   0.275	   0.022	   12.284	   <	  .0001	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   0.477	   0.023	   20.939	   <	  .0001	  
RSQ	   0.022	   0.055	   0.406	   .685	  
Drug	   -­‐0.06	   0.082	   -­‐0.733	   .465	  
Drug	  *	  Offer	  Amount	   0.024	   0.032	   0.752	   .452	  
Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  RSQ	   0.029	   0.011	   2.66	   .008	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	   -­‐0.058	   0.033	   -­‐1.757	   .079	  
Drug	  *	  RSQ	   -­‐0.038	   0.082	   -­‐0.466	   .643	  
Drug	  *	  Predicted	  Expected	  Return	  *	  RSQ	   -­‐0.094	   0.017	   -­‐5.433	   <	  .0001	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Table	  14.	  Counterfactual	  Guilt	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.4046,	  SD	  =	  0.6361).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.043	   0.09	   0.478	   .634	  
Amount	  Returned	   -­‐0.184	   0.037	   -­‐4.947	   <	  .0001	  
Counterfactual	  Deviation	   0.531	   0.048	   11.033	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	   0.145	   0.124	   1.166	   .246	  
Amount	  Returned	  *	  Counterfactual	  Deviation	   -­‐0.152	   0.019	   -­‐8.182	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	  *	  Counterfactual	  Deviation	   -­‐0.085	   0.048	   -­‐1.786	   .075	  
	  
	  
Table	  15.	  Counterfactual	  Guilt	  &	  GASP	  Negative	  Behavior	  Evaluation	  (NBE)	  
	  
Subjects	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  random	  effect	  with	  varying	  intercepts	  (s2	  =	  0.4046,	  SD	  =	  0.6361).	  All	  
continuous	  variables	  were	  standardized.	  
	  
Predictor	   Parameter	  
Estimate	  
SE	   t	  -­‐	  Value	   p	  -­‐	  Value	  
Intercept	   0.046	   0.083	   0.555	   .58	  
Amount	  Returned	   -­‐0.185	   0.038	   -­‐4.93	   <	  .0001	  
Counterfactual	  Deviation	   0.524	   0.048	   10.842	   <	  .0001	  
Drug	   0.147	   0.115	   1.278	   .204	  
GASP	  NBE	   0.259	   0.058	   4.506	   <	  .0001	  
Amount	  Returned	  *	  Counterfactual	  Deviation	   -­‐0.157	   0.019	   -­‐8.408	   <	  .0001	  
Amount	  Returned	  *	  GASP	  NBE	   -­‐0.036	   0.041	   -­‐0.87	   .385	  
Counterfactual	  Deviation	  *	  GASP	  NBE	   0.098	   0.044	   2.214	   .027	  
Drug	  *	  Counterfactual	  Deviation	   -­‐0.067	   0.048	   -­‐1.389	   .165	  
Drug	  *	  Counterfactual	  Deviation	  *	  GASP	  NBE	   -­‐0.116	   0.053	   -­‐2.193	   .029	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